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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in cryptographic theory have pointed the
way toward constructions of provably-secure indistinguisha-
bility obfuscators for Boolean functions [1]. However, as with
many other theoretical advances, the reduction to practice may
be problematic. The constructions may be very difficult to
implement; the constructions may “leak” information through
side-channels that are not considered by the theoretical proofs;
and the obfuscated functions may be “bloated” to the point
that they are not feasibly computable on a handheld device, a
desktop computer, or even on a supercomputer.
This article is an early response to the 30 September 2014
announcement of the SafeWare research program, managed
by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) [2], which will explore the practical feasibility of
provably-secure obfuscation, as well as to advance the theory
of such obfuscations.
Any obfuscators which are constructed under SafeWare
will be evaluated for their runtime overhead (average and
worst-case), their obfuscation security level (e.g. an adversary
work factor), and any potential side-channel vulnerabilities.
In this article we propose a framework for evaluating runtime
overheads.
SafeWare-funded researchers will attempt to construct ob-
fuscated programs which are provably secure, i.e. programs
whose de-obfuscation would involve the solution of a problem
which is known, or generally believed, to be computationally
infeasible. Currently, the only plausible candidates for such
constructions are what we would call functional obfuscators, as
opposed to control-flow obfuscators, data obfuscators, system-
call obfuscators, communication obfuscators, or semantic ob-
fuscators (in which portions of the program are expressed
in a programming language that is initially unknown to the
adversary).
Current techniques in control-flow flattening, opaque pred-
icates, and the breaking of abstractions [3] are specifically
excluded from attention in SafeWare, because programs ob-
fuscated by these techniques may be de-obfuscated without
solving a computationally-hard problem. It remains an open
question, to be addressed by SafeWare-funded theoreticians,
whether or how the control-flow graph of a program could
be encoded into an obfuscated function which does not leak
important information about control flow to a reverse engineer
who performs a dynamic analysis on the obfuscated program.
Our focus in this article is on what we call functionally-
obscure programs. We say a program is functionally-obscure
if it contains an obfuscated function whose behaviour is
required for program correctness, i.e. if a change to its value
at any point might cause the program to behave incorrectly.
Functional obscurity is not, in and of itself, a solution to
digital rights management of software, because an attacker
may replace an obfuscated password-recognition function by
a stub which returns true for any input, or they may invert the
comparison logic so that the program accepts any password ex-
cept the correct one [4]. However functional obscurity may still
be an important line of defense in a digital rights management
system, and it may also be used to meet other security goals. In
particular, functional obscurity would significantly mitigate the
risk of password leakage, if password-recognition functions
are securely obfuscated in a computational environment which
is well-secured against adversarial observation and control.
The most promising line of research into functionally-
obscure obfuscators is, at present, based on the security model
of “indistinguishability obfuscation” with respect to a set of
circuits, such as NC1. This set of functions may be, informally,
considered to be a “crowd” of functions within which any
individual function of practical interest would be “anonymous”
(i.e. indistinguishable from any other member of the crowd)
– even after an attacker has spent a long time probing its
behaviour (by observing its output on adversarially-controlled
inputs) in an effort to determine its secret identity.
Indistinguishability obfuscation is an appropriate security
concept for password-recognition functions, and for all other
“point” functions (such as signature-verifiers). An attacker
who is unable to deobfuscate, or to exploit a side-channel,
must perform an exhaustive search over all likely inputs to
the obfuscated function to discover the point at which its
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output changes. If a securely-obfuscated password-recognition
function can be efficiently evaluated on low-cost computing
platforms, and if it can be economically produced by an
obfuscation process, this would be of great practical utility.
However if the obfuscation is weak, then the obfuscation is
a dangerous waste of computational resource. This line of
reasoning suggests that the provision of adequate security is
the primary requirement on a functional obfuscator.
In this article, we do not attempt to evaluate the adequacy
of security – this is a very challenging technical problem
which includes the construction of a valid security model.
Instead, we focus on the easier, but still quite challenging
and important, problem of evaluating the performance of an
obfuscated function.
The runtime performance of a securely-obfuscated function
is always a satisficing requirement for its end-users: rapidly-
evaluating functions are preferable to slowly-evaluating func-
tions. However, in any given application, the maximally-
acceptable runtime performance is a feasibility constraint. This
constraint may be extremely challenging, or even infeasible,
to satisfy. For example, in the specific case of password-
recognition functions, end-users will not wait years, and they
may not even be willing to wait seconds, for a program to
accept or reject their password.
We cannot predict the most important applications of ob-
fuscated function, so we cannot benchmark a general tech-
nique for secure obfuscation against a fixed-time threshold.
However we can establish some indicative runtime constraints,
e.g. we might insist that the recognition of an 8-character
password must be accomplished within 1 second on a mid-
spec smartphone such as a Samsung Galaxy S III. Highly-
specific performance requirements of this nature are very
important in acceptance-testing, but they would provide little
or no guidance to theoreticians whose insights and theorems
are based on asysmptotic analysis..
It is technically challenging – and this is the primary
technical focus of our article – to construct an easily-assessed
measure of runtime performance which is valid, at least as
a rough approximation, on a wide variety of contemporary
computing platforms, for a wide variety of functions which
might plausibly be obfuscated.
In Section 2, we argue that the runtime cost of functional
obfuscators should be estimated as n
√
w, where n is the
number of 2- or 3-input gates in the obfuscated circuit, and
w is the width of a program which represents the obfuscated
circuit. We believe that this functional form is simple enough
to guide asymptotic analyses, while being accurate enough to
provide appropriate guidance.
Our definition of the width of a program is a significant
restriction on the usual notion of circuit width, because (in
version 1 of our file format) a program of declared width
w which represents a Boolean circuit may have at most w2
Boolean inputs and at most w2 Boolean outputs. In subsequent
versions of our file format, after experimentation on the
range of contemporary computational platforms and functions
of practical interest, we may relax this restriction, perhaps
allowing as many as w4 inputs and outputs (with a significant
time-penalty for such extended-IO) to a width-w program.
We have not parameterised our cost function on the depth
of the circuit, even though such cost functions have been
researched extensively in circuit complexity theory, because
we are benchmarking low-cost computational platforms which
are evaluating Boolean functions with billions or trillions of
logic gates. Our cost estimate is intended to model the effects
of the memory (or I/O) bottleneck that will arise when the
platform’s evaluation of a Boolean function requires a working
set which exceeds the cache (or main-memory) capacity of the
platform. Circuit depth would only become important if it were
impossible to avoid a CPU bottleneck, i.e. in the case of very
narrow circuits. We do not expect this case to arise in practical
applications of obfuscated functions, for the reasons discussed
in Section 2.
In Section 3, we propose a space-efficient and
computationally-appropriate file format (BPW) for the
evaluation of very large Boolean functions with bounded
program width. There are many existing formats for
describing Boolean circuits, and any of these might be
used for describing obfuscated functions. Some formats
are restricted to combinational logic, and therefore may
be more compact than formats which support sequential
logic or those which specify implementations such as
programmable logic arrays or full-custom integrated circuitry.
Some formats are designed to help designers create attractive
visual representations of small circuits. We encourage future
researchers on functionally-obscure software to consider
using any convenient representation when generating their
circuits, then translate into our representation when storing
a very large circuit in a computer file, or when evaluating a
very large circuit in software. If we are funded to contribute
to SafeWare, we would envisage implementing routines to
a translate circuit-description files from our BPW format
into a (very small subset of) IEEE VHDL [5], and vice
versa. By our preference, and because SafeWare “emphasizes
the idea of creating and leveraging open source architecture
technology” [2], our translation routines will be open-sourced.
We claim no intellectual-property rights over the BPW format
disclosed in this article.
In Section 4, we propose an experimental method for
evaluating our proposed cost metric, to determine its range
of validity for contemporary computing platforms such as
smartphones, laptops, and desktop computers.
We summarise our contributions in Section 5.
II. COST METRIC
Obfuscated functions may be deployed occasionally on
supercomputers, however we believe most commmercially-
important functionally-obscure programs will be on mass-
market platforms such as smart sensors, smart phones, battery-
powered laptops, and desktop computers. Functionally-obscure
programs could conceivably be used in cloud-computing envi-
ronments, and in ad-hoc distributed computing environments,
however the secure evaluation of a Boolean function in a
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distributed environment has quite a different set of cost drivers
due to the latency and bandwidth limitations of communi-
cation links. Readers who are interested in communication-
limited functional evaluations should review the literature on
distributed secure computations [6], whereby geographically-
separated parties can provide secret inputs to a collaboratively-
evaluated function such as the result of an auction or a
democratic vote.
The computational platforms of relevance to our context
have limited parallelism at any level of their memory hierar-
chy. At any given instant, there may be thousands or even tens
of thousands of register-level operations in progress; dozens
of cache operations; a few main-memory operations; and one
or two secondary-storage operations. Cache, main-memory,
and secondary-storage operations are of particular relevance,
whenever a computer is evaluating a Boolean function with
millions or trillions of gate-equivalents, unless the function is
narrow enough that the working set of the evaluation process
will fit in the registers.
We base the analysis in the remainder of this section on the
premise that securely obfuscated programs must have widths
of 50 or more.
We define the term “width of a program” only informally
in this section, as a rough measure of its working set. We will
give this term a formal definition in Section 3, when we define
our BPW format.
Seven-character passwords, and (generally) cryptographic
keys that are shorter than 50 bits are susceptible to a brute-
force attack; so we use w = 50 as the lower limit of our range
of interest. We encourage SafeWare-funded security analysts
to critically examine this lower bound on w for validity, that
is, to determine whether or not there is a general method of
feasible attack on a width-49 BPW program.
The width of a circuit is well-established analytic concept
[7], [8], [9]. If the gates of a circuit are arranged in levels (or
rows), such that each level has at most w gates, and such that
the gate-outputs at each level are connected only to gate-inputs
on the next level, then the circuit has width w.
The width of a function is the width of its narrowest gate-
level implementation in any circuit, in a given logic family
(e.g. in 2-AND, 2-OR, and NOT gates).
A program which describes a circuit implementing a func-
tion may have a width that greatly exceeds the width of the
function. We believe that such unnecessarily-wide programs
are the most promising candidates for functional obfuscations,
because the process of circuit analysis is impeded very signif-
icantly by its width, and because it may be very difficult, or
even computationally infeasible, for an adversary to discover
a narrower implementation.
Wide circuits can be evaluated efficiently on parallel com-
puters. For example, a circuit of width 50 or more may be
evaluated by a 50-thread computation of the following form.
Each thread runs a straight-line program in which it fetches a
few Boolean inputs, computes a simple Boolean function, and
writes a Boolean value into a shared memory area. It is not
necessary to write programs with such explicit parallelism,
in order to exploit much of the parallelism available on a
modern CPU. Hundreds or thousands of machine instructions
may be concurrently in the execution pipeline of a single
CPU core, and a single-threaded computation which relies on
the instruction-scheduling hardware is (in many cases) more
efficient than a multithreaded computation with explicit locks.
The CPUs on high-end desktop computers may soon have
some transactional memory features [10] which could allow
an extremely efficient multithreaded evaluation of Boolean
circuits – if the evaluation state is small enough to be held
in L1 cache.
As indicated in the previous paragraph, modern computers
have widely differing numbers of CPU cores, and they have
widely differing organisations of their memory systems. This
diversity implies that a circuit evaluator which is highly tuned
for efficiency on one platform may be very poorly optimised
for another platform. Our response to this engineering chal-
lenge is to propose a special-purpose programming language
for the evaluation of large and wide Boolean circuits. Our
language should be efficiently interpretable on any platform,
and it may be compiled with platform-specific optimisations if
even higher performance is required. In the remainder of this
section, we identify the most important factors which affect
the runtime performance of a circuit evaluator on any platform,
and we develop some rough estimates of performance in
particular cases, with the goal of developing a general formula
for predicting runtime performance on any platform.
One of the key factors in any performance estimation is the
size of the working set of the program. If the working set can
be held entirely in CPU registers, the computation will never
be stalled on cache accesses. If the working set is cache-local,
then the computation will never be stalled on main memory
accesses. If the working set is small enough to fit in main
memory, then the computation will not thrash the secondary
storage device. Accordingly: our programming language has a
wordsize of 1 bit, so that its interpreter may (depending on the
platform) minimise the size of its working set by packing and
unpacking bits into machine words. This is a CPU-memory
tradeoff, for the pack/unpack operations may result in a CPU-
bottlenecked evaluation which could be avoided (at the cost of
occasional cache faults) by storing Boolean values in machine
bytes or words rather than in machine bits.
As indicated earlier, we are restricting our attention to
circuits with width at least 50. We are also restricting our
attention to circuits with at least millions (106) of 2- or 3-input
gates. Smaller circuits seem unlikely to be securely obfuscated.
Furthermore, initial constructions from an asymptotically-valid
theory such as indistinguishability obfuscation are rarely, if
ever, efficient with respect to constant factors and additive
constants.
If a circuit with a million 3-input gates is not organised
for temporal locality during its evaluation, then its width will
be 500000 or more, and every gate-evaluation will require
three fetches and one store on a million-bit state vector. This
vector, even if it is stored bitwise in 128 KB, is too large for
L1-locality on most contemporary computers. However this
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state vector, and thus the working-data set of the evaluation,
will fit comfortably in the L2 cache of a smartphone, laptop,
or desktop computer. The evaluation of each logic gate will
thus involve four L1 misses: three reads and one write. A
tightly-written inner loop for an interpreted evaluation might
execute thirty machine instructions per gate-evaluation, so we
estimate one L1 miss per eight machine instructions. Modern
processors are very inefficient with such high L1 miss rates;
their memory systems are tuned for miss rates not exceeding a
small fraction of a percent, very roughly 1/300. We conclude
that a disorganised evaluation will have a slowdown of a factor
of approximately 300/8 = 40 in comparison to a memory-local
(CPU-bottlenecked) evaluation of a narrower circuit on the
same platform.
High-end GPUs in desktop computers may support very
rapid evaluations of Boolean circuits, so long as the circuit
description is compressed well enough to avoid a communi-
cation bottleneck at the GPU-CPU interface. We expect that
a disorganised billion-gate circuit would be evaluated by a
high-end GPU at a rate approaching one gate-evaluation per
four DRAM cycles, that is, at (very roughly) 10 million gate-
evaluations per second. Note that, due to the disorganisation,
each a DRAM word in the 128 MB working set of this billion-
gate evaluation contains only a single bit of relevance to its
current stage of computation.
NVIDIA’s Fermi architecture for its GPUs has 32k general-
purpose registers and 512 ALU cores [11]. We thus expect
the working set of a well-optimised interpreter to be held
in GPU registers, if the Boolean circuit has width 10000 or
less. The description of the billion-gate circuit will not be
register-local, but it could be streamed from main memory at
a rate of perhaps 3 GB/s, using DMA over its PCIe channel.
Our BPW format will encode gates in very large circuits at
(roughly) 8B/gate, so we estimate high-end GPU performance
on moderately-organised billion-gate Boolean circuits to be 3/8
billion evaluations per second. This is roughly 40 times faster
than our estimated performance for GPUs on disorganised
billion-gate circuits.
Based on the preceding performance estimates, we tenta-
tively identify n (circuit size) and w (program width) as the
most important factors controlling runtime performance on any
platform, under the constraints that w ≥ 50 (so that the com-
putation is at least 50-way parallelisable) and 106 ≤ n ≤ 109
(so that it is reasonable to assume the circuit description is in
main memory, thereby avoiding I/O bottlenecks). If we aim
only at predicting the relative performance for two different
evaluations on the same platform, we need not encumber our
predictions with platform-specific parameters if we adopt a
general model of memory system performance. In prior work,
we suggested one such model [12]. We will use this model to
develop a performance estimate, immediately after describing
it briefly in the next paragraph. In Section 4 we propose a
set of experiments which would validate (or invalidate) our
performance model.
Our general model of memory system performance is based
on the assumption of a hierarchical memory system which may
be visualised as a triangle. At the apex of the triangle are the
CPU registers; at the base is a very small number of secondary
storage devices such as solid-state or magnetic disks. The
hierarchy has two to four intermediate layers: main memory
(typically DRAM), and one to three levels of CPU cache
(typically SRAM). The memory at the top of the hierarchy
is very fast, with a small blocksize: a word in a CPU register
typically holds 4 to 8 bytes. The memory at the bottom of
the hierarchy is very slow, and it has a very large blocksize
to enable a generally-appropriate tradeoff of bandwidth for
latency. If the blocksize of a disk transfer is too small, then
any random or linear access would deliver only a few bytes of
useful data, and the latency on this access might be millions
of times larger than the CPU cycle time – so a computation
that is bottlenecked at this level will proceed at a rate of
only a few bytes per millions of CPU cycles. However if the
blocksize is too large, then only a tiny fraction of a randomly-
accessed block will be useful. As a general rule of thumb,
the blocksize of a layer of memory is the square root of its
capacity. The capacity Si of the i-th layer also seems to be
a power function (perhaps Si = (Si−1)1.4) of the capacity of
the layer immediately above it, with the random-access latency
Li of each level also growing as a power function (perhaps
Li = (Li−1)
0.6) [12].
We can not predict absolute performance from a general
model such as the one above. However we can predict relative
performance, to an accuracy of perhaps a factor of 10. We do
not believe it is feasible to devise a general model that is more
accurate than this, given the diversity of contemporary com-
puting platforms. Indeed, we believe that estimating relative
performance within a factor of 10 in a general model is a very
challenging technical problem, even when the computational
workload is limited to the evaluation of Boolean circuits. On
a general workload, a computation may be bottlenecked in
many different ways: by CPU instruction bandwidth, by CPU
instruction latency, by memory latency, by memory bandwidth,
by latency or bandwidth of interprocessor communication, or
by power consumption (for heat- or battery-limited compu-
tations). We tentatively identify memory latency as the most
critical constraint, on most platforms, when they are evaluating
large Boolean circuits. Memory latency bottlenecks arise when
the working set is overly large.
We can measure the speed of a circuit evaluation in gate-
evaluations per second. We expect our experimentation to
confirm that this rate is nearly constant, after a brief startup
transient – if the program width (and thus the working set
of its evaluator) does not vary significantly by level. We are
moderately confident that the obfuscated functions constructed
under SafeWare will conform to this expectation. However,
if constructions of obfuscated functions are compositions of
moderately-wide functions with very wide functions, then (in
subsequent work) we will adjust our programming language
to accomodate series-parallel functional compositions with
4
declared widths on each subcircuit.1
Evaluation rates will almost surely be nondecreasing in the
size of the working set, but there will be very significant
nonlinearities in this relationship whenever the working set
is almost equal to the capacity of a layer of memory. A fully-
accurate timing model would be parameterised on the thresh-
old values of w which (for a particular evaluation method and a
particular platform) are likely to cause this evaluation method
to become memory-bottlenecked at that level. A generally-
valid timing model cannot have any platform-specific param-
eters, so we restrict our attention to cost functions of the form
nwα.
Earlier in this section, we performed two platform-specific
estimations which suggested a factor of 40 difference between
the per-gate-evaluation time for a circuit which is too wide to
be efficiently evaluated, in comparison to a circuit which is
narrow enough to be efficiently evaluated. The range of interest
in circuit width is 50 to 500000 – a factor of 10000. A factor
of 40 difference is, very roughly, a square root of this range;
so we have seized on the square root as a convenient exponent
(α = 0.5) for the effect of circuit width w on gate-evaluation
rate, on any given platform, for any given family of circuits.
Our proposed cost metric is thus n
√
w. We may revise the
exponent on w, if experiments (such as the ones described
in Section 4) on contemporary platforms of interest suggest
that such revision would be appropriate. However we see
very little chance that the best-fit exponent α, as determined
by experimentation, will be below 0.4 or above 0.7, except
perhaps for long-running computations on battery-powered
platforms where (for theoretical reasons [12]) we would expect
to observe power-limited computations with runtimes propor-
tional to nw.
III. FILE FORMAT
In this section, we briefly sketch an efficient format for
describing large Boolean circuits of bounded width. These
files have the extension .BPW, as an acronym for “bounded
program width”, so the corresponding “magic bytes” must
appear first in their header: 0x42, 0x50, 0x57. The fourth byte
is a version number. Version 0x01 is described in this article.
Four 8-byte integer parameters appear next in the file: w, n,
a, b. The first parameter is the declared width w of the circuit,
as represented in this BPW program. The next parameter is the
declared number of gates n in the circuit. The third parameter
is its number of Boolean inputs. Runtime arguments to the
evaluation function would supply these inputs, in order to
determine the values of the circuit’s b (the fourth parameter)
Boolean outputs.
We require a ≤ w2 and b ≤ w2. These may seem very
unnatural restrictions to a circuit-complexity theorist, because
a width-w circuit of n 3-input gates could naturally be allowed
to have up to 2w external inputs per level, with different
1The COPY operation in version 0x01 of BPW will allow a width-w
evaluation of series-parallel compositions of arbitrary width-w subfunctions,
subject to the constraints that no subfunction has more than √w outputs and
that no more than
√
w subcircuits are evaluated in parallel.
inputs being accepted on each of Ω(n/w) levels. Such a circuit
might produce n output bits. However our emphasis is not
on theoretical elegance, but is instead on representing circuits
so that they can be evaluated efficiently on a contemporary
computer system such as a handheld device.
The body of a BPW file is a sequence of n gate-descriptors.
Syntax errors are clearly possible, for example the body of a
BPW file may not have exactly n gate-descriptors. A formal
syntax for BPW is outside of the scope of this article – because
our intent is to sketch the initial (pre-release) version of this
language in sufficient detail that its design can be discussed, in
a workshop setting, prior to the finalisation of a first production
version.
Each gate-descriptor starts with a 4-bit nibble encoding its
type, with the following possibilities (enumerated from 0 to
0xF): NOT, AND2, OR2, NAND2, NOR2, XNOR2, AND3,
OR3, NAND3, NOR3, XOR3, XNOR3, MUX3, COPY, un-
defined. Note that gate type 0xF is undefined in version 0x01
of the BPW format. Future formats may use 0xF as a prefix
for multiple-nibble gate-type descriptors.
Version 0x01 of BPW has one type of 1-input gate, six
types of 2-input gates, seven types of 3-input gates, and a
three-input ’COPY’ pseudogate which is used for extended-
length IO operations as well as to represent width-w parallel
compositions while maintaining locality in the state vector of
the evaluation process. We take the (positive-logic) convention
that 0 encodes a FALSE value and 1 encodes a TRUE value.
The third input of MUX3 controls which of its first two inputs
should be copied onto its output, with a control of 0 selecting
the first input of this 2-input multiplexor. The logic function
of every other gate type should be clear from its mnemonic.
We will explain the semantics of the COPY pseudogate,
immediately after discussing the detailed semantics of logic-
gate evaluation.
Gate input-specifiers are references to:
• any of w external inputs (indexed as 0 to w − 1),
• any bit in a length-w circular queue of results from prior
gate-evaluations (indexed as w to 2w − 1),
• any (single-bit) result of an evaluation of a gate on the
previous level of gates. These results are stored in a
length-2w circular queue, indexed as 2w to 4w−1 in gate-
descriptors; and these registers are locked against reads
during the virtual-machine cycle in which they are being
written. Gate evaluations are done in a w-way parallel
fashion, so only w of these bit-registers are available as
inputs while the other w are being updated.
Summarising the above, input-specifiers are indexes into the
register file of a virtual machine with 4w bits of storage. The
virtual machine state also has an instruction pointer (into the
input stream of the BPW file), and two register-pointers (of
length ⌈lg 2w⌉) which maintain the states of the two circular
queues.
The reservations on bit-registers give BPW the flavour of
a VLIW instruction set, in which it is the programmer’s
responsibility to schedule operations in order to acheive w-
way parallelism. The resulting “forbidden” values of input-
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specifiers will be annoying to human programmers, but will
not be problematic for compilers. We expect circuit theorists to
have little difficulty with this representation, for (as explained
previously) the theoretical notion of circuit-width is involves
the assignment of gates to levels, with at most w gates per
level, under the restriction that gate inputs are connected either
to external inputs or to outputs from the previous level. If (as
required in BPW) we have exactly w gates per level (after
encoding nops e.g. as OR2 gates with two inputs connected to
the output of the first gate on the preceding level), and if we
index the gates on even-numbered levels as 2w..3w−1 and on
odd-numbered levels as 3w..4w − 1, then we have accurately
specified the interlayer connections in a BPW program.
The first w external inputs are loaded into bit-registers
0 through w − 1 prior to the evaluation of the first gate-
description by the virtual machine.
The semantics of the COPY pseudo-gate is, we think, best
explained by its motivation: to mimic a cache fault which has
been well-predicted by a programmer.
Prior to the first gate-evaluation, the virtual machine’s main
memory is initialised so that the a external inputs to the circuit
are available in the first ⌈a/w⌉ words of w bits each, in
a randomly-accessible I/O space. When gate-evaluations are
completed by the virtual machine, they are written into main
memory at successively higher addresses starting from address
0. These writes are naturally expressed as w-bit words, with
each word representing the evaluated outputs from one level
of gates in a width-w circuit.
The COPY pseudo-gate is a read-operation from the circuit
inputs or the main memory of the virtual machine, into its
registers. The first operand of COPY is an input-specifier
which identifies the relevant word to be read. The second
operand specifies the number of bits to be extracted from
this word, and the third operand specifies the starting bit-
position within the retrieved word. Destination registers are
specified implicitly: extended-input values are written into the
circular-queue of input registers (indexed as 0 to w − 1 by
input-specifiers), and prior-evaluation results are written into
the circular-queue of prior-result registers (indexed as w to
2w − 1 by input-specifiers).
If the first operand of a COPY is in the range 0..w−1, then
it is an extended-input read. For example COPY(1, 1, 0) is a
read of the w-th input bit. The result is written into the next
available bit-register (indexed by virtual machine pointer PI)
of the circular queue 0..w−1. After every COPY, this register
is incremented: PI += 1 mod w. Initially PI = 0. Every BPW
program starts with an implicit COPY(0, w, 0) – so that the
first w circuit inputs are available for immediate use in gate-
evaluations.
If the first operand of a COPY is in the range w..2w − 1,
then it is a prior-result read. The target address of every such
read is relative to the virtual machine’s prior-result pointer
PR, whose value is initially 0. The prior-result pointer of
the machine is incremented by one after each gate-evaluation:
PR = (PR + 1) mod 2w) +w. The output of the i-th gate on
the j-th preceding level is accessible as COPY(j, 1, i).
The latency of a COPY operation is
√
w, as measured in
VLIW instruction times; it is w
√
w, if measured in gate-
evaluation instructions. This latency is enforced by syntactic
restrictions on BPW version 0x01. We call such programs
BPW1 for convenience. Subsequent versions of BPW may
have different restrictions. A BPW1 program is invalid if
• it contains more than one COPY operation per w instruc-
tions, or
• if the result of a COPY by a BPW instruction at level
i is referenced by a gate-evaluation instruction at level
j < i+
√
w.
Levels are defined by counting the non-COPY instructions
in a program, with level 0 being the initial level, and the
level counter being incremented after every w non-COPY
instructions. As previously indicated, a gate-evaluation has
latency 1, that is, its result is unavailable to gate-evaluations
in the same level but is available to gate-evaluations in the
subsequent level.
If the first operand of a COPY is in the range 2w..3w− 1,
then its semantics are undefined in version 0x01 of BPW. In
future versions, BPW semantics may be extended to allow
more external inputs (perhaps up to w4) and more prior-results
(perhaps up to w4) to be accessible, with an appropriately-high
latency (perhaps w2).
In version 1 of BPW, we emphasise programming conve-
nience (and CPU cycle-timing) over file compression; so we
nibble-align all of the input-specifiers (rather than bit-aligning
them for optimal compression). The length, in nibbles, of each
input-specifier is ⌈lg 4w/2⌉. For example, a width-50 circuit
requires 1 byte (2 nibbles) for each input-specifier. If it were
composed entirely of 2-input gates, then each gate (with its
1-nibble type) is encoded in 2.5 bytes. A disorganised circuit
with a million gates could be declared to have width 500,000;
so it would require 5 nibbles for each input-specifier, for a
total of 5.5 bytes per gate.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
In this section, we briefly sketch some experimentation
which would validate (or invalidate) our cost function and our
BPW language design.
A. Workload
The experimental workload consists of two types of BPW
programs at varying n (size), w (width), and d (density of
COPY operations), for all
w = {5, 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000,
50000, 100000, 500000}, (1)
n = {106, 107, 108, 109}, (2)
d = { 1
w
,
1
2w
,
1
4w
, ...,
1
2⌊lg(n/w)⌋w
}. (3)
.
The first type of program implements a randomly-chosen
function with k = min(w, 50) inputs and k outputs. The
second type of program is a lightly obfuscated password
recogniser, for the very insecurely-chosen k-bit password
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0x1555...555. The output of the password recogniser is 1 if
the input matches the password, 0 otherwise.
The first type of program consists of a sequence of nd/(1+
d) repetitions of the following subcircuit: 1/d randomly-
generated NAND2 gates, a randomly-generated COPY
pseudogate-specifier. The input-specifiers on the NAND2 gates
are generated from i.u.d. variates on {0, 1, ..., 4w−1}, discard-
ing any generated values which are invalid due to the unini-
tialised or unavailable bit-registers at this point in the BPW
program. The first input-specifier on each COPY pseudogate
is i.u.d. on the currently-valid values in {w,w+1, ..., 3w−1}.
The second input-specifier of each COPY pseudogate is
⌊√w/2⌋, the number of bit-registers to be written. When
such COPY pseudogates appear in a BPW program at density
d = 1/w, then (due to the latency of COPY operations) about
half of the prior-results cache is being updated at any time
during the program execution. The other half of the prior-
results cache may be referenced by input-specifiers.
The password-recogniser should compute w copies of its
output bit in its last ⌈lg min(w, 50)⌉ levels, using XOR2 and
XNOR2 gates on the first of these levels and using AND2
gates for the remaining levels. Note that the i-th bit of the
secret password is encoded in the type (XOR2 or XNOR2)
of the gate which receives two copies of the i-th input bit.
The input bits are permuted in the intermediate levels of the
password-recogniser. Each intermediate level is composed of
w NOT gates with input-specifiers which (collectively) define
a random permutation on w elements – so that each interme-
diate level is a very weak obfuscation (by bit-scrambling) of
the input. The first level of the password-recogniser is also
composed of NOT gates, with the i-th gate having input-
specifier i mod min(w, 50).
B. Systems under test
A BPW execution environment should be set up on a mid-
spec smartphone (such as a Samsung Galaxy III S), a mid-spec
laptop computer, a mid-spec desktop computer (using its CPU
as the function evaluator), and a mid-spec desktop computer
using its CUDA-enabled GPU as the function evaluator.
C. Primary measurements
The experimenter should measure the runtime and total
energy consumption of the function evaluator, exclusive of
loading the circuit description into the primary memory of the
computing platform. The function evaluator should be coded
in three different ways:
1) For ease of programming, with the 4w bits of eval-
uation state (w inputs, w prior subcircuit outputs, w
current subcircuit outputs, w copied outputs from a prior
subcircuit in a parallel composition) stored in a single
machine-addressible array of 4w bytes or words;
2) For memory latency, with the 4w bits of evaluation state
in a bit-packed array;
3) To avoid CPU and GPU bottlenecks, if the resourcing
of the experimental team permits this: BPW programs
should be compiled into machine code that is well-
optimised for each platform. We expect such compila-
tions to avoid CPU bottlenecks on any platform, except
for very small w; whereas the byte-by-byte interpre-
tations of the first two codings may introduce CPU
bottlenecks for w up to 500, and GPU bottlenecks may
be unavoidable unless the code is compiled.
D. Secondary measurements
The experimenter should collect a timeseries, at 10 msec
intervals, of the temperature and cycle rate of the CPU or
GPU. These timeseries should be annoted, to indicate the
start-time, stop-time, and identity (program type, n, w, d,
type of evaluation method) of each BPW evaluation in the
experimental sequence. The platform under test should be
allowed to cool down to a baseline temperature before starting
another evaluation.
E. Hypotheses under test
1) On each platform, for both program types, and for each
of its available evaluation routines: confirm that the
runtime for each w is linear in n, and is nondecreasing in
w, with a factor of about
√
500000/50 = 320 separating
the runtime curve for w = 50 from the runtime curve
for w = 500000. Fail to accept the hypothesis if the
computed separation in runtime for small and large w is
either less than 32 or greater than 3200, for any platform,
circuit type, or evaluation routine.
2) Compute a best-fit value of a speedup ratio R for each
platform, function type, and evaluation type, where R
is the average speedup (over all feasible n) for the
evaluation of a width-50 circuit as compared to the
evaluation of a width-500000 circuit. Confirm that the
best-fit value for R is not significantly affected by
platform, function, or evaluation method.
3) Compute a ratio of the total energy consumption of
each computation to the value nw, this formula being
a theoretical prediction of the energy consumption of a
memory-limited computation on a computational device
that is optimised for energy efficiency [12]. Confirm that,
for w = 500000, this ratio (a measure of peta-reference-
bytes per watt-hour) is within a factor of 10 across all
platforms.
4) If experimental resources permit, perform additional
experimentation on larger n with very large w to confirm
that a power bottleneck is possible i.e. that the CPU or
GPU speed has been throttled to avoid overheating. If
power bottlenecks are commonly observed within the
range of practical interest, then the cost function nw
should be considered as a possible replacement for the
proposed n
√
w.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have discussed the promise of indistiguishability obfus-
cation (iO) as a technique for obfuscating programs, we have
proposed a method for estimating the time required to evaluate
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an obfuscated function, and we have proposed an experimental
method for validating our proposed estimation method.
At the time of writing, iO is a very promising theory that
has not yet been reduced to practice. There are no published
methods for producing feasibly-computable iO circuits for any
functions of practical importance, such as the recognition of
a 50-bit password.
Our BPW language is directly comparable to Barrington’s
a w-BP language [13]. Regrettably, Barrington’s programs do
not have easily-predictable performance on real-world com-
puter systems, because their unrestricted references to inputs
may result in IO bottlenecks. In Barrington’s circuit-theoretical
context, any charge for access to inputs “would lead to a class
far too restricted to be interesting” [13].
In a possible variant of BPW (or w-BP) which models
online computations, an input stream of unbounded length
may be presented on a one-way read-only tape. If such IO
streams ever become a promising line of theoretical enquiry
for functional obfuscation, then a future version of BPW
should allow streamed-IO – at some blocksize and latency that
has been experimentally determined to be feasibly achievable,
on a wide variety of contemporary mass-market computing
platforms in typical networking environments.
Barrington has proved that any language recognised by an
NC1 circuit can be recognised by 5-PBP, that is, by a restricted
5-BP in which all of the w-maps are permutations. Each
instruction in a 5-BPB could be implemented in 3w BPW
instructions in a computation of declared width 4w, if the
length of the input is bounded by w. This construction may
be devoid of practical relevance, because of its very restrictive
input bound, and because Barrington’s 5-PBP program is
exponential in the depth of the NC1 circuit.
We suspect that partial evaluations will be important in
many applications of functional obfuscation. This could be
handled via the syntax of the call to the functional evaluator,
whereby the output of the partial evaluation is a new BPW
program which describes an efficiently-computable projection
of the original program with a correspondingly-reduced set of
inputs.
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